Deshotel v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
7-31-1958
Deshotel v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Torts Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Deshotel v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. [DISSENT]" (1958). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 36.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/36
664 DESHOTEL V. T. & S. F. RY. Co. [50 C.2d 
F. No. 19912. In Bank. July 31, 1958.] 
ELOYCE DESHOTEL, Appellant, v. THE ATCHISON, 
'I'OPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY 
(a Corporation) et al., Respondents. 
[1] Husband and Wife-Actions Against Third Persons-Loss of 
Consortium.-A wife whose husband has been injured as the 
result of the negligence of a third person cannot maintain an 
action for loss of "consortium" (noneconomic aspects of the 
marriage relation, including conjugal society, comfort, affec-
tion and companionship). (Disapproving statement in Gist v. 
French, 136 Cal.App.2d 247, 257 [288 P.2d 1033], indicating a 
contrary rule.) 
[2] !d.-Actions Against Third Persons-Loss of Consortium.-
The granting of relief to the wife for loss of consortium caused 
by negligent injury to her husband would constitute an ex-
tension of common-law liability, and since such extension 
would involve problems of policy or procedure, such as danger 
of double recovery in case the husband obtained a judgment 
including compensation for impairment of his ability to par-
ticipate in a normal married life, the difficulty of measurement 
of damage for loss of companionship in terms of money, the 
possibility that a child or parent might seek to enforce similar 
claims, and the faet that such recovery might work hardship 
on persons who had made settlement with the husband be-
lieving that the wife could not sue, any departure from the 
rule denying the wife's right of recovery should be left to 
legislative action rather than to pieeemeal determination by 
judicial decision. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County. A. J. Woolsey, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action by wife for damages for loss of husband's con-
sortium. Judgment for defendants after sustaining demurrer 
without leave to amend, affirmed. 
James A. Myers and D. W. Brobst for Appellant. 
Robert W. Walker, William J. Hayes, Hardin, Fletcher,. 
Cook & Hayes and Cyril Viadro for Respondents. 
[1] Wife's right of action for loss of consortium, 23 A.L.R.2d 
1378. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Community Property, § 70, Husband and 
Wife, ~ 95: Am.Jur., Husband and Wife, § 491. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Husband and Wife, § 185(2). 
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GIBSON, C. J.-Plaintiff's husband was severely injured 
when a taxicab in which he was a passenger collided with a 
train. He sued the railway company, the taxicab company, 
the train engineer, and the cab driver, obtaining a judgment 
in the amount of $290,000, which was affirmed on appeal 
(Deshotel v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 144 Cal.App.2d 224 
[300 P.2d 910]). During the pendency of that action plain-
tiff brought this suit against the same defendants. She alleged 
that as a result of their negligence her husband was injured 
in such a manner that she "has been denied his care, protec-
tion, consideration, companionship, aid, and society" and 
that "by reason of the loss of the consortium of her husband" 
she has been damaged in the sum of $100,000. A general de-
murrer by the railway company and the engineer was sus-
tained without leave to amend, and plaintiff has appealed 
from the ensuing judgment.* 
[1] The sole question presented is whether a wife whose hus-
band has been injured as the result of the negligence of a 
third person may maintain an action for loss of "consortium," 
a term which is used in this opinion to refer to the noneco-
nomic aspects of the marriage relation, including conjugal 
society, comfort, affection, and companionship. The question 
is one of :first impression in this state, but it has been answered 
by the courts in many other jurisdictions. In England and in 
the vast majority of American jurisdictions the wife has been 
denied the right to recover for loss of consortium. (Best v. 
Samuel Fox & Co., Ld. [Eng.], (1952) A. C. 716; Filice v. 
United States (1954), 217 F.2d 515, 517; Josewski v. Midland 
Constructors, Inc. (1953), 117 F.Supp. 681; Jeune v. Del E. 
Webb Canst. Co. (1954), 77 Ariz. 226 [269 P.2d 723] ; Franzen 
v. Zimmerman (1953), 127 Colo. 381 [256 P.2d 897] ; Giggey 
v. Gallagher Transp. Co. (1937), 101 Colo. 258 [72 P.2d 
1100] ; Ripley v. Ewell (Fla., 1952), 61 So.2d 420; Brown v. 
Kistleman (1912), 177 Ind. 692 [98 N.E. 631, 40 L.R.A.N.S. 
236]; Cravens v. Louisville & N.R. Co. (1922), 195 Ky. 257 
[242 S.W. 628]; Coastal Tank Lines v. Canales (1955), 207 
Md. 37 [113 A.2d 82, 86-88] ; Emerson v. Taylor (1918), 133 
Md. 192 [104 A. 538, 5 A.L.R. 1045] ; Hartman v. Cold Springs 
Granite Co. (1956), 247 Minn. 515 [77 N.W.2d 651]; Stout 
v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. (1913), 172 Mo.App. 113 
*The taxicab company and its driver are not mentioned in the judg-
ment or the notice of appeal, and the record does not disclose the status 
of the case with respect to them. 
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[157 S.W. 1019]; Bernhardt v. Perry (1918), 276 Mo. 612 
[208 S.W. 462, 13 .A.L.H. 1320] ; Larocca v. American Chain 
& Cable Co. (.App.Div., 1952), 23 N.J.Super. 195 [92 .A.2d 
811, 812-814]; Tobiassen v. Polley (1921), 96 N.J.L. 66 [114 
.A. 153]; Don v. Benjamin M. Knapp, Inc. (1953), 281 .App. 
Div. 893 [119 N.Y.S.2d 801] (affd., 306 N.Y. 675 [117 
N.E.2d 128]) ; Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co. (1915), 93 Ohio St. 
101 [112 N.E. 204, L.R.A. 1916E 700, .Ann.Cas. 1918D 206]; 
Nelson v. A. M. Lockett & Co. (1952), 206 Okla. 334 [243 
P.2d 719] ; Howard v. Verdigris Valley Electric Cooperative, 
Inc. (1949), 201 Okla. 504 [207 P.2d 784]; Garrett v. Reno 
Oil Co. (Tex.Civ . .App., 1954), 271 S.W.2d 764; Nickel v. 
Hardware Mutual Cas. Co. (1955), 269 Wis. 647 [70 N.W.2d 
205].) .As noted in a large number of these cases, the with-
holding of such a right from the wife at common law was 
due to the fact that she was regarded as not having suffered 
a compensable injury rather than to her disqualification from 
suing in her own name, which was removed by passage of Mar-
ried Women's .Acts. 
With the exception of a North Carolina decision, sub-
sequently overruled (Hipp v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & 
Co., 182 N.C. 9 [108 S.E. 318, 18 .A.L.R. 873], overruled by 
Hinnant v. Ticle Water Power Co., 187 N.C. 288 [126 S.E. 307, 
37 .A.L.R. 889] ) , the right of the wife to recover for loss of 
consortium caused by negligence was not recognized until 
1950, when the case of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 
held she was entitled to relief.* .A few decisions have followed 
the Hitaffer case. (Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F.Supp. 448; 
Missouri Pacific Tmnsp. Co. v. Miller, 227 .Ark. 351 [299 
S.W.2d 41, 45 et seq.]; Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, 
88 Ga . .App. 519 [77 S.E.2d 24] ; Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 
272 [78 N.W.2d 480].) However, most courts which have 
considered the problem since 1950 have followed the majority 
rule and have refused to permit the wife to maintain an 
action of this type. 
In a number of jurisdictions where the wife has not been 
allowed recovery, the husband is given such a right if his 
wife is negligently injured. (See Prosser on Torts (2d ed. 
1955), 701 et seq.; Rest., Torts, § 693; 133 .A.L.R. 1156, 1157; 
23 .A.L.R.2d 1378, 1380.) Plaintiff argues, in effect, that the 
courts which withhold relief from the wife have relied upon 
medieval concepts of the marriage relation, that in modern 
*The Hitaffer case was subsequently overruled on another point. 
(Smither tf Co., Inc. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220.) 
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times the marital status of the wife has changed, placing her 
in a position equal to that of her husband, and that there is 
no longer any reason to refuse her the kind of redress which he 
may obtain. Some jurisdictions, however, have denied re-
covery to the husband as well as to the wife. (Lockwood v. 
Wilson H. Lee Co., 144 Conn. 155 [128 A.2d 330, 331]; Bolger 
v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 205 Mass. 420 [91 N.E. 389] ; 
Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co., 184 Mich. 304 [151 N.W. 724, 
726-727, L.R.A. 1915D 524, Ann.Cas. 1916C 882]; Helmstetler 
v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821 [32 S.E.2d 611, 613] .) The 
law in California with respect to the right of the husband is 
not settled. In Meek v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 175 Cal. 53, 
56 [164 P. 1117], it was said that damages could not be ob-
tained by a husband for the loss of his wife's "society, or 
what is termed the consortium." This statement was rejected 
as "inadvertent dictum" in Gist v. French, 136 Cal.App.2d 
247 [288 P.2d 1003], which held that a husband whose wife 
had been negligently injured could recover not only for the 
loss of services but also for the loss of cohabitation and society. 
We agree that the quoted statement in the Meek case is dictum, 
but a statement in the Gist case which indicates that the wife 
may recover for loss of consortium resulting from a negli-
gent injury to her husband is also dictum (see 136 Cal.App. 
2d 247, 257), and, for the reasons hereafter given, the language 
in the Gist case relating to the wife's rights is disapproved. 
[2] It is clear that the granting of relief to the wife for loss 
of consortium caused by negligent injury to her husband would 
constitute an extension of common law liability, and the 
courts are justifiably reluctant to depart from established 
limitations on recovery. Obviously, such an extension would 
also involve problems of policy or procedure. A judgment 
obtained by a husband after he is injured by a third person 
might include compensation for any impairment of his ability 
to participate in a normal married life, and, if his wife is 
allowed redress for loss of consortium in a separate action, 
there would be danger of double recovery. Any harm she sus-
tains occurs only indirectly as a consequence of the defendant's 
wrong to the husband, and the measurement of damage for 
the loss of such things as companionship and society would 
involve conjecture since their value would be hard to fix in 
terms of money. Moreover, if a cause of action in the wife 
were recognized on the basis of the intimate relationship 
existing between her and her husband, other persons having 
a close relationship to the one injured, such as a child or 
668 T. & S. F. Rv. Co. C.2d 
parent, would likely seek to enforce similar claims, and the 
courts would be faced with the perplexing task of determining 
where to draw the line with respect to which claims should 
be upheld. Another difficulty is that judicial, as distinguished 
from statutory, recognition of the wife's cause of action would 
operate retroactively and might work hardship upon persons 
who, in reliance upon the common law rule, have made settle-
ment with the husband, believing that the wife could not sue. 
In our view the Legislature rather than the courts can 
best deal with these problems. For example, the Legislature, 
if it found this type of suit to be desirable, could define the 
extent of the liability, designate who may maintain the action, 
and provide safeguards against the danger of double recovery, 
such as a requirement that there be a joinder of the person 
directly injured and the one consequentially harmed. The 
Legislature could also specify whether the proceeds should 
belong to the plaintiff alone or to both spouses. ( Cf. Civ. 
Code, § 163.5, declaring that damages awarded a married per-
son for personal injuries are the separate property of such 
person.) Some of the objections noted above with respect 
to an action by the wife apply with equal force to one brought 
by the husband, but a husband's claim is not before us, aud 
we need not determine whether such a claim should be allowed. 
Clarification by statute as to both the husband and the wife 
would, of course, be preferable to piecemeal determination of 
the problems by judicial decision. 
The cases of Work v. Campbell, 164 Cal. 343 [128 P. 943, 
43 L.R.A.N.S. 581], and Follansbee v. Benzenberg, 122 Cal. 
App.2d 466 [265 P.2d 183, 42 A.L.R.2d 832], are not in-
consistent with our conclusions. Iu the ltV ork case the de-
fendant, with the intention of causing the plaintiff and her 
husband to separate, knowingly made false statements to the 
wife about the husband, inducing her to treat him harshly, 
with the result that he left her and she was permanently de-
prived of his society, affection, and support. The case thus 
did not concern negligent injury to the husband with indirect 
damage to the wife but, instead, involved conduct which was 
actionable because it was designed to inflict direct harm upon 
her. The Follansbee case is also readily distinguishable. The 
recovery there permitted was not for loss of consortium but 
for medical expenses which the plaintiff wife had paid when 
her husband was negligently injured. The wife was obligated 
by statute to pay such expenses, and the relief granted was 
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for a measurable economic loss that she was required to 
bear as a result of the defendant's wrong. 
Nor are the decisions in point which hold that in an action 
for wrongful death loss of the decedent's society, comfort, 
and protection may be considered as a factor in determining 
damages. (Blackwell v. American Film Co., 189 Cal. 689, 
700-701 [209 P. 999] ; Beeson v. Green 111onntain G.JJI. Co., 
57 Cal. 20, 38-39; Newton v. Thomas, 137 Cal.App.2d 748, 
769-770 [291 P.2d 503] ; Burke v. City & County of San 
Francisco, 111 Cal.App.2d 314, 322 [244 P.2d 708] .) These 
cases were decided under section 377 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, which created a cause of action not recognized at 
common law. (Earley v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 176 Cal. 
79, 81 [167 P. 513, LR.A. 1918A 997] .) 
The Legislature has not seen fit to alter the common law 
rule that the wife cannot recover for the loss of consortium 
resulting from a negligent injury to her husband, and we 
are of the opinion that any departure from the overwhelming 
weight of authority in support of that rule should be left to 
legislative action. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, 
J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The holding in the majority opinion that a wife may not 
recover for loss of consortium resulting from a negligent in-
jury to her husband is a denial of equal protection of the 
laws. 
It was held in Gist v. French, 136 Cal.App.2d 247 [288 
P.2d 1003] that a husband may recover for loss of consortium 
resulting from a negligent injury to his wife. This court 
unanimously denied a hearing on December 14, 1955. The 
statement in the majority opinion that ''The law in Cali-
fornia with respect to the right of the husband is not settled'' 
would appear to ignore the very definite holding in the Gist 
case that the husband may recover for the loss of his wife's 
consortium since only the statement therein concerning the 
wife's cause of action for loss of her husband's consortium 
is disapproved. 
There is no sound reason for denying either husband or 
wife a right of recovery for the loss of consortium of the 
spouse. ''The parties to a marriage are each entitled to the 
comfort, companionship and affection of the other. Any inter-
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ference with the right of either spouse to the enjoyment of 
the other is a violation of a natural right as well as a legal 
right arising from the marriage relation.'' (Gist v. French, 
136 Cal.App.2d 247, 257 [288 P.2d 1003] .) In California 
''A married woman may be sued without her husband being 
joined as a party, and may sue without her husband being 
joined as a party in all actions, including those for injury to 
her person ... " and for injury to her reputation, etc. (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 370.) The statement in the majority opinion 
that the ''granting of relief to the wife for loss of consortium 
caused by negligent injury to her husband would constitute 
an extension of common law liability" ignores the present-day 
status of the wife and her emancipation from old-world con-
cepts that the wife was but a chattel of the husband without 
either feelings to be injured or rights to be considered. That 
the plaintiff in the case at bar has suffered a complete loss of 
consortium there can be no doubt. She has been deprived of 
her husband's companionship, of his society as a husband, of 
her right to bear children. In place of a healthy, normal 
husband she now has a hopelessly bedridden invalid. Inso-
far as loss of consortium is concerned there appears to be very 
little difference, if any, from the wife's loss of her husband 
as set forth in W ark v. Campbell, 164 Cal. 343 [128 P. 943, 
43 L.R.A.N.S. 581]. In the Work case the wife lost her 
husband because of false statements knowingly made by de-
fendant to the wife about the husband. This case is ''dis-
tinguished'' by the majority on the ground that ''negligent 
injury" with "indirect damage" to the wife was not involved. 
It is interesting to note in this regard that this court, in the 
Work case, specifically noted ( 164 Cal. at p. 346) that "The 
direct cause of her husband's departure was, of course, her 
own conduct toward him, and such departure was in no degree 
brought about by any statement or act of the defendant, 
except in so far as his statements and advice to the plaintiff 
influenced her conduct toward her husband, which was the 
sole direct cause of his leaving, and of any change in his feel-
ings toward her." (Emphasis added.) It is clear that the 
defendant's conduct in the Work case only indirectly caused 
the wife to lose her husband's consortium. ''As to those 
authorities which hold that the injury to the wife is not 
compensable because it is indirect, we simply state that if 
that be so then it would likewise be true in the husband's 
suit. But such is not the rule here. Invasion of the con-
sortium is an independent wrong directly to the spouse so 
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injured. The mere fact that the loss of one or the other of 
the elements thereof may have been indirectly redressed in 
another's suit, does not make the injury to the remaining 
elements any less direct. 
"The argument that the injuries of which a wife complains 
are too remote and consequential fails for two reasons. In 
the first place, we are committed to the rule in negligence cases 
that where in the natural and. continual sequence, unbroken 
by any intervening cause, any injury is produced which, but 
for the negligent act would not have occurred, the wrongdoer 
will be liable. And it makes no difference whether or not 
that particular result was foreseeable. Secondly, if such a 
rule were valid there could be no basis for distinguishing be-
tween an action by a husband and one by the wife. In both 
cases the damages for the sentimental elements would be too 
remote and consequential; and yet we do not apply such a rule 
in the husband's action." (Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 
811, 815; and see Warner v. Ranta Catalina Island Co., 44 Cal. 
2d 310, 319 [282 P.2d 12] ; Rtasttlat v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 
8 Cal.2d 631 [67 P.2d 678) ; Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 
Cal.2d 213, 219 [157 P.2d 372, 158 A.hR. 872]; Sawyer v. 
Rmdhern Calif. Gas Co., 206 Cal. 366 [274 P. 544] .) There 
would seem to be no sound reason for distinguishing the two 
eases: In both the wife lost her husband and her right to his 
consortium. It is the injury which is the important thing and 
not the way in which it was caused by the defendant. If a 
wife's body is injured, she has a right of action for the negli-
gent conduct of the defendant causing the injury. In the 
case at bar, the negligent conduct of the defendants caused 
her to lose all rights to her husband's consortium and the 
injury should be compensable. In Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 
183 F.2d 811, 817, the court said: "'l'here can be no doubt, 
therefore, that if a cause of action in the wife for the loss of 
consortium from alienation of affections or criminal conversa-
tion is to be recognized it must be predicated on a legally pro-
tected interest. Now then, may we say that she has a legally 
protected and hence actionable interest in her consortium 
when it is injured from one of these so-called intentional inva-
sions, and yet, when the very same interest is injured by a 
negligent defendant, deny her a right of action 1 It does not 
seem so to us. Such a result would be neither legal nor logical. 
On the contrary, it has already been held in this jurisdiction 
that her interest in the marriage relation is coextensive with 
that of her husband, and that any interference therewith is a 
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violation of her legal rights. When a legally protected inter-
est of a person has been injured by the wrongful act of 
another, it is no less actionable because the invasion was 
negligent rather than intentional.'' 
The reasoning found in the majority opinion concerning the 
''problems'' of policy or procedure which might arise is no 
less fallacious and unsound. Why should the injury suffered 
by the wife be any more difficult to compute in monetary 
damages than the same injury to the husband? "Like actions 
for pain and suffering, no definite rule can be prescribed for 
the measurement of the loss of his wife's society. The value 
of such loss must be determined by the triers of fact in the 
exercise of a sound discretion in the light of their own experi-
ence, observation and reflection. (Robison v. Lockridge, 230 
App.Div. 389 [244 N.Y.S. 663]. See also Hagy v. Allied 
Chemical & Dye Corp., 122 Cal.App.2d 361, 374 [265 P.2d 
86] ; Edminster v. Thorpe, 101 Cal.App.2d 756, 759 [226 P.2d 
373].)" (Gist v. French, 136 Cal.App.2d 247, 256 [288 P.2d 
1003].) "This result poses no problems in ascertaining the 
wife's damages. Simple mathematics will suffice to set the 
proper quantum. For inasmuch as it is our opinion that the 
husband in most cases does recover for any impairment of his 
duty to support his wife, and, since a compensable element of 
damages must be subject to measure, it is a simple matter to 
determine the damages to the wife's consortium in exactly 
the same way as those of the husband are measured in a similar 
action and subtract therefrom the value of any impairment of 
his duty of support." (Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 
819.) 
I am not impressed with the argument of the majority that 
if this court recognizes that the wife has a cause of action 
for the loss of her husband's consortium the parents or chil-
dren might "seek to enforce similar claims." Consortium, as 
the term is known in the law, refers to the ''conjugal fellow-
ship of husband and wife, and the right of each to the com-
pany, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every 
conjugal relation.'' (Black's Law Dictionary, fourth ed.; 
McMillan v. Smith, 47 Ga.App. 646 [171 S.E. 169, 170]; 
Shedrick v. Lathrop, 106 Vt. 311 [172 A. 630, 632] ; Harris v. 
K1tnkel, 227 Wis. 435 [278 N.W. 868, 869] ; Hitaffer v. Ar-
gonne Co., 183 F.2d 811; Gist v. French, 136 Cal.App.2d 247 
[288 P.2d 1003] .) It would seem, therefore, that neither a 
parent nor a child could seek to enforce the right of con-
sortium. 
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I am also not impressed with the argument in the majority 
opinion that to allow the wife to recover for her right of 
consortium might "work hardship" upon persons who had 
made settlement with the husband "believing that the wife 
could not sue." Undoubtedly the applicable statute of limi-
tation would take care of such ''retroactive operation'' so that 
those causing the injury to the wife's consortium would not 
be subjected to "hardship." Furthermore, the same argument 
could be made with respect to the husband's cause of action 
for the loss of his wife's consortium. Since in this state the 
wife has a right to sue for her own personal injuries and since 
she has the right to contract with others as if unmarried (Civ. 
Code,§ 158) she, too, might agree to settle with the wrongdoer. 
No case has come to my attention where undue hardship, or 
any hardship for that matter, has been caused the wrongdoer 
since the decision in Gist v. French, 136 Cal.App.2d 247 [288 
P.2d 1003), where the husband was permitted to recover for 
the loss of his wife's consortium. 
The actual injury to the wife from loss of consortium, which 
is the basis of the action, is the same as the actual injury to 
the husband from that cause. His right to the conjugal 
society of his wife is no greater than her right to the conjugal 
society of her husband. Marriage gives each the same rights 
in that regard. Each is entitled to the comfort, companion-
ship, and affection of the other. The rights of the one and the 
obligations of the other spring from the marriage contract 
( Civ. Code, § 155; Follansbee v. Benzenberg, 122 Cal.App.2d 
466 [265 P.2d 183, 42 A.L.R.2d 832]), are mutual in character, 
and attach to the husband as husband and to the wife as 
wife. Any interference with these rights, whether of the 
husband or of the wife, is a violation, not only of natural right, 
but also of a legal right arising out of the marriage relation. 
Since the wrongs of the wife are the same in principle, and 
are caused by acts of the same nature, as those of the husband, 
the remedy should be the same. (Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 
183 F.2d 811, 816.) It follows, logically and legally, that, 
since the husband and wife have equal rights in this state, if 
one has a remedy for the invasion of a right, the other should 
have the same remedy. To hold otherwise as does the ma-
jority is a denial of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed 
by both the federal and state Constitutions. 
The reasoning in the majority opiuion is neither logical nor 
sound, and the defendants' demurrer to plaintiff's complaint 
should be overruled. 
50 C.2d-22 
